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Resumen
Usando una nueva base de datos que incluye la composición por monedas de activos y pasivos de firmas del
sector no financiero, este estudio analiza los efectos y determinantes de los descalces cambiarios en Chile. En
línea con estudios anteriores, encontramos que después de una depreciación real las firmas con más deuda en
dólares no tienen un desempeño peor que sus pares con deuda en pesos. Sin embargo, una vez que controlamos
adecuadamente por las diferencias entre firmas en la composición por monedas de sus activos, sus ingresos y
por su uso de derivados, encontramos efectos de balance significativos. Adicionalmente, encontramos que los
derivados juegan un rol importante en aislar a las firmas de la volatilidad cambiaria. Encontramos, además, que
las firmas en nuestra muestra calzan la moneda de sus pasivos con la de sus ingresos y activos, utilizando
derivados sólo si no cuentan con cobertura a través de ingresos y activos. Finalmente, encontramos cambios
significativos en el nivel de exposición cambiaria luego de la flotación del tipo de cambio de 1999.
Argumentamos que la mayor volatilidad cambiaria, y sus efectos en el riesgo relativo de la deuda en pesos y
dólares, son una posible explicación para esta caída.
Abstract
Using a new database on the currency composition of assets and liabilities this paper explores the determinants
and consequences of currency mismatches in Chilean non-financial firms. As in previous firm level studies for
Chile, we find that in periods following a depreciation firms with higher dollar debt do not underperform their
peso counterparts. However, once we adequately control for differences in the currency composition of assets,
income and net derivative positions, we do find a significant balance sheet effect. In addition, we find that
derivatives play a role in insulating firm level investment from exchange rate shocks. In line with previous
studies, we also find evidence of currency matching in Chilean corporates. Firms in Chile actively reduce the
risks associated with exchange rate exposure by matching the currency composition of their debt with that of
their income and assets, and by taking on derivatives if no “real” hedge is available. Finally, we find significant
changes in the level of net currency exposure after the exchange rate was floated in 1999. We argue that one
possible interpretation of these results is due to the effect of higher exchange rate variance on the relative risk of
domestic and foreign debt.
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Emails:  kcowan@bcentral.cl; lherrera@bcentral.cl.The potential financial vulnerability that can occur when private sector or
government agents acquire high levels of foreign currency debt has been at
the center of discussion since the financial crises that affected the
countries of Southeast Asia in the late 1990s. To the extent that a mismatch
is generated in the denomination of assets and liabilities, foreign currency
debt increases agents’ vulnerability to fluctuations in the exchange rate.
After a depreciation, the debt-asset ratios increase, interest rates rise in
relation to income and access to new debt is limited. For firms in the
private sector (especially those that operate in the nontradable sector),
these balance sheet effects reduce output and investment and, in extreme
cases, lead to the bankruptcy of firms and financial instability.
Measuring the empirical relevance of these negative effects of foreign
currency debt is particularly important for the conduct of monetary and
exchange rate policies in emerging markets. In conventional open-economy
models à la Mundell-Fleming, exchange rate depreciations have an expansionary
effect on domestic output. It follows that in the face of a contraction of
foreign demand or a reduction of international liquidity, monetary
authorities should reduce domestic interest rates and let the exchange rate
depreciate in order to stabilize output. The expansionary effect of the
depreciation of the peso may be reversed, however, if firms are highly
indebted in dollars and the balance sheet effects are significant. Under
these circumstances, the optimal policy response to a negative external shock
would be a tight monetary policy and a strong defense of the peso.
1
A growing literature, using aggregate data, finds empirical evidence that
justifies this concern about the effects of the mismatches generated by the
dollar debt. In particular, evidence shows that both dollarization of
external liabilities and dollarization of the domestic financial system are
correlated with increased volatility of output and capital flows and with
greater financial vulnerability. Moreover, external dollarization reduces the
expansionary effects of a depreciation and makes a sudden stop in capital
flows more likely.
2
In contrast to the macroeconomic literature, a second group of studies
based on firm-level data obtains ambiguous results on the impact of a
depreciation on investment and output of firms with dollar debt.
3 This
ambiguity has two possible explanations. The first is that currency
mismatches are not quantitatively important, and the macroeconomic evidence
is therefore likely to be capturing omitted variables, correlated with the
                        
1. Although they suffer problems of endogeneity, a couple of studies argue that the
dollarization of liabilities leads to a “fear of floating” the domestic currency. Panizza,
Hausmann, and Stein (2001) find that countries that are able to borrow externally in their own
currencies allow greater fluctuations of the exchange rate relative to fluctuations of the
interest rate and their reserves. Along a similar line of research, Levy Yeyati, Sturzenegger,
and Reggio (2003), using de facto and de jure classifications of the exchange rate, find that the
level of dollar liabilities (relative to the money supply) is positively correlated with the
probability of fixing the exchange rate.
2. McKinnon and Pill (1998) document that many of the Asian economies that experienced
financial crises in the second half of the 1990s maintained high levels of dollar debt. Calvo,
Izquierdo, and Mejía (2004) find that domestic bank dollarization, measured by the sum of dollar
deposits and foreign loans, increases the likelihood of a sudden stop in net capital inflows.
Levy Yeyati (2003, 2005) shows that a banking crisis is more likely after a currency depreciation
in countries in which domestic banks are highly dollarized, and these countries also have more
volatile output growth rates. Céspedes (2004) provides evidence that exchange rate depreciations
have a less expansionary effect when the level of dollar debt is higher. Eichengreen, Hausmann,
and Panizza (2003) show that countries with a higher proportion of dollar-denominated foreign
debt have more volatile growth of output and capital flows, and their sovereign debt obtains
lower ratings from the rating agencies. Finally Arteta (2003) presents evidence in the opposite
direction. This author does not find statistically significant evidence that dollarization in the
domestic banking system makes a banking crisis more likely.
3. For a detailed summary of the literature on balance sheet effects from dollar debt, see
Galindo, Panizza, and Schiantarelli (2003) and Bleakley and Cowan (2005).2
level of dollarization, which are the true determinants of the financial
volatility and vulnerability. The second explanation relates to the
endogeneity of the currency composition of the debt. This explanation has two
components. The first relates to the use that this literature makes of the
dollar debt as a proxy for currency mismatches. If the firms that maintain
dollar debt are also the firms whose income is highly correlated with the
real exchange rate, then dollar debt will be a bad measure of the currency
mismatch. The second component relates to the endogeneity of currency
mismatch decisions. In particular, if firms with strong mismatches are
precisely those for which the balance sheet effects are less important,
depreciations could be expected to have a small effect on their output and
investment levels.
In this study, we argue that the lack of conclusive empirical results at
the firm level is due to the endogeneity of the debt choice, not to the
absence of a balance sheet effect. To test this, we construct a new database
of around 200 firms in the Chilean nonfinancial sector, which includes
information on the currency composition of their liabilities, assets, and
revenue and their net currency derivative positions. As far as we know, this
is the first database that includes such detailed information on the currency
mismatches on and off the balance sheet of firms in an emerging economy.
Our main result is that after we adequately control for differences in the
composition of assets and revenue and for the net derivatives position, we
find a significant balance sheet effect in the sample of Chilean firms. In
other words, currency mismatch is important. We also find that currency
derivatives play a role in isolating firms’ investment decisions from
currency shocks and that the balance sheet effect is smaller for firms that a
priori we think have fewer constraints on access to credit.
On the choice of dollar debt, we find evidence of currency hedging among
the Chilean firms. Firms in Chile hedge the currency composition of their
liabilities, assets, and revenue, and they take derivative positions if they
do not have a "real" hedge.
4 This is why dollar debt is higher in firms with
dollar assets and in firms that export part of their sales. We also find that
currency exposure is negatively correlated with measures of credit
constraints and a measure of investment opportunities.
5 This suggests that the
firms that are the most exposed to exchange rate risk are the best prepared
for taking this risk.
A key question when considering the determinants of dollar debt is the role
of exchange rate policy. By increasing the variance of the real exchange rate
in the short and medium terms, a flexible exchange rate policy increases the
relative risk of the dollar debt, inclining the balance in favor of the peso
debt. In line with this hypothesis, we find significant changes in the level
of currency exposure after the implementation of a floating exchange rate
regime in Chile in 1999. This fall is significant, even after we control for
interest rate differentials.
1. EFFECTS AND DETERMINANTS OF CURRENCY MISMATCHES: A SUMMARY OF THE
LITERATURE
Several empirical studies use firm-level data to test the presence of a
balance sheet effect generated by the increase in the peso value of dollar-
denominated debt due to the depreciation of the exchange rate. At first
                        
4. This result is consistent with the results obtained for Asia by Allayanis and Weston
(2001).
5. Measured as the deviations of dollar debt net of derivatives from the levels predicted by
a simple regression between debt in dollars, assets in dollars, and exports.3
sight, the results are not conclusive. Some studies find that, in the period
immediately after a devaluation, dollar-indebted firms do not invest
relatively less than firms with peso-denominated debt. Other articles
conclude that the balance sheet effect is, in fact, important and
statistically significant. The former group includes the work of Bleakley and
Cowan (2005). In a sample of 450 nonfinancial firms from five Latin American
countries, the authors do not find a negative and significant effect of
dollar debt on investment following a depreciation. The authors argue that
this result is due to the fact that firms hedge the composition of their
liabilities with their assets and revenue, so a currency devaluation leads to
an increase not only in the peso value of the debt, but also in the income
received and the value of their assets. These results are confirmed by
Bonomo, Martins, and Pinto (2003) using a sample of Brazilian firms;
Benavente, Johnson, and Morandé (2003) using a sample of Chilean firms; and
Echeverry and others (2003) using a large sample of Colombian firms (around
8,000). None of these studies finds a negative and significant coefficient
for the interaction between dollar debt and exchange rate depreciation.
Luengnaruemitchai (2004) studies the impact of depreciations on investment in
nonfinancial firms in Asia, the region that brought the risks associated with
currency mismatches to the forefront of the discussion following the
financial crisis in the region in the late 1990s (see McKinnon and Pill,
1998). Again, it is not possible to identify a negative and significant
effect of the interaction between dollar debt and the rate of currency
depreciation.
There are several possible explanations for this lack of results. The first
relates to the way in which currency exposure is measured. Although the firms
with more dollar debt are affected by a contractionary balance sheet effect,
this could be offset by a competitiveness effect derived from the fact that
they have dollar-denominated assets or that their income is positively
correlated with the currency depreciations. Consistent with this hypothesis,
studies that control for the competitiveness effect find that the most
dollar-indebted firms invest relatively less immediately after a
depreciation—that is, after controlling for the competitiveness effect, there
is a negative and significant balance sheet effect (Aguiar, 2002; Pratap,
Lobato, and Somuano, 2003).
The second explanation relates to the endogeneity of currency exposure
decisions. In particular, an extensive theoretical literature, as well as a
growing empirical literature, maintains that firms determine their optimal
level of risk exposure based on their vulnerability to situations of
financial distress and their set of investment possibilities. Froot,
Sharfstein, and Stein (1993) develop a model in which the cost of financial
distress is the loss of investment opportunities. In this context, currency
hedging reduces the cost of external financing and mitigates the problems of
underinvestment described by Myers (1977). The implication is that firms will
increase their currency hedging if they are vulnerable to critical financial
situations or have better investment opportunities. In the context of the
literature on balance sheet effects and currency exposure, this means that
the investment decisions of firms with a high level of currency exposure
could be less sensitive to balance sheet effects.
From the empirical point of view, firm-level studies that seek to explain
firms’ hedging decisions center mainly on the use of derivatives. Gezcy,
Minton, and Schrand (1997), and Allayanis and Ofeck (2001), using data from
500 nonfinancial U.S. firms listed in Forbes, find that derivative use is
positively correlated with investment opportunities, measured by expenditure
on research and development, firm size, and the interaction between firm
leverage and the market-to-book ratio (a measure of investment
opportunities); and negatively correlated with the level of firm liquidity,4
measured by the quick ratio. Bartram, Brown, and Fhele (2004) use data on
currency, interest rate, and commodity derivatives on 7,000 nonfinancial
firms in forty-eight countries; they find that the firms that use currency
derivatives the most also have income generated by foreign sales, are listed
on foreign stock exchanges, or have foreign-currency-denominated debt. Firms
also use currency hedging more if they have higher leverage, lower quick
ratios, and higher market-to-book ratios.
Finally, Allayanis, Brown, and Klapper (2001) study currency hedging in
nonfinancial firms from eight Asian economies over the 1996–98 period. In
contrast to the U.S. studies, the evidence reported does not support the
hedging theories described above. The authors find that liquidity-constrained
firms and firms with higher investment opportunities do not use derivatives
more and that currency derivatives are substitutes for foreign-currency
revenue generated by sales. They also find that firms in countries with
sufficiently large interest rate differentials have a lower level of hedging,
which suggests that in this case firms trade off the higher risks of currency
hedging with the benefits of cheap foreign credit.
2. CURRENCY  MISMATCHES, BALANCE  SHEET  EFFECTS,  AND  HEDGING IN
NONFINANCIAL FIRMS
The empirical strategy in our framework is based on the estimation of a
hedging equation at the firm level. The estimation is derived from a simple
mean-variance framework in which we assume that the firm’s profit function is
concave on the level of its net worth:







where β* is the ratio of dollar debt to assets; α is the share of firm assets
that produce foreign currency operational income; τ + ε is the expected
interest rate differential between domestic and foreign currency debt, which
we assume has an aggregate component τ, and a firm level idiosyncratic
component ε; µ is a measure of firm risk aversion; and σz is the variance of
the real exchange rate.
In the absence of interest rate differentials (τ + ε  =  0), the firm will
choose the currency composition of its debt to match that of its assets (net
operational income). However, if there are differential costs between peso
and dollar borrowing, they will choose to carry some foreign exchange
exposure in their balance sheet in order to reduce their expected borrowing
costs. In other words, if there is a gap between domestic and foreign
borrowing costs adjusted for expectations τ or if the firm has some
idiosyncratic advantage that allows it cheaper access to foreign currency
debt  ε, then a currency mismatch will result. For a given interest rate
differential, the size of this mismatch is decreasing in the expected
volatility of the exchange rate, σz, and the degree of the firm’s risk
aversion, µ.
We start by measuring the size and significance of balance sheet effects on
investment in Chilean firms in section 4. Our specific empirical strategy is
to assess whether firms with more dollar debt invest relatively less in the
aftermath of a depreciation. We do so by estimating reduced-form equations
for fixed capital investment. The proposed mechanism centers on the5
interaction of alternative measures of currency mismatch with shifts in the
exchange rate. Thus the key variable in our analysis in this section is for
firm i in period t:
,1 FOREIGN DEBT lnEXCHANGE RATE it t − ×∆ .
If firms are behaving according to equation 1, foreign currency debt will
be a poor measure of currency exposure in the balance sheet. If firms
systematically match the currency composition of their assets and income α,
with that of their liabilities β, then empirical estimates of the balance
sheet effects based on dollar debt alone will be biased upwards, as firms
holding high shares of dollarized debt see the largest increases in profits
following a depreciation. We therefore augment this basic specification with
a series of controls for α, using firm level data on exports, foreign assets,
and net derivative positions.
In section 5, we examine the extent of matching between foreign currency
assets, income, and liabilities directly within the cross-section of firms in
our sample. First, we check the relation between foreign currency debt, net
derivative usage, and the currency composition of assets and net income at
the firm level. Next, we check whether variables that the corporate finance
literature argues are correlated with firm risk aversion, µ, explain
deviations in observed debt composition levels from the matching composition.
Since we do not directly observe firm-level values of α, we look at the
absolute value of deviations of β from the level predicted by the matching
equations estimated in the previous subsection and correlate these deviations
with proxies for µ.
Finally, in section 6, we analyze how the change in the macroeconomic
policy regime in Chile in the late 1990s affected foreign currency hedging by
firms. As is evident from equation 1, monetary and exchange rate policy
affects the extent of hedging in firms through its impact on the economywide
interest rate differential τ, and the exchange rate volatility σz. A key
component of the new policy regime was the adoption of a floating exchange
rate regime. This caused both an increase in exchange rate volatility and a
compression of interest rate differentials. Therefore, we expect the level of
currency exposure of Chilean firms to decline after the shift to the floating
exchange rate regime in the late 1990s. We further test whether the decline
was larger for firms that are likely to be more risk averse because of
capital market imperfections. In the final section, we attempt to separate
the effects of changes in interest differential from changes in exchange rate
volatility after 1999.
3. THE DATABASE
Our data consist of firm-level accounting information for nonfinancial
corporations in Chile for the period 1995 to 2003. We also have data on firm
exports, sectors in which the firms operate, and ownership. Our main source
of information is the Chilean Superintendency of Securities and Insurance
(the Superintendencia de Valores y Seguros, or SVS),which requires all firms
categorized as corporations to disclose their accounting information using a
standardized format (the Ficha Estadística Codificada y Uniforme, or FECU).
We use nonconsolidated data, so that investments in subsidiaries are reported
in a separate account and not as a part of the aggregate stock of fixed
assets.6
Data on the currency composition of liabilities and assets is not recorded
directly in the FECUs, but is reported in the notes attached to each firm's
annual financial statistics. These notes are not standardized and are not
available in an electronic format. We therefore start with the data on
foreign currency liabilities assembled by Benavente, Johnson, and Morandé
(2003).
6 We then input data on foreign currency assets and derivatives
collected from each of the notes mentioned above.
For our estimates, we use a sample restricted to the nonfinancial firms for
which foreign-currency data are available. Table 1 shows the number of
observations in the final sample per year, as well as descriptive statistics
for the main variables we use. The size of the sample changes as new firms
are incorporated into the SVS database.
[table 1 about here]
Our main measure of firm performance is investment in fixed capital,
measured as the change in gross fixed assets. Accounting standards in Chile
only contemplate revaluations of fixed assets for consumer price index (CPI)
inflation, making it possible to separate investment from changes in the
accounting valuation of capital goods.
Our main measure of currency exposure is foreign currency debt (D*), the
book value of foreign currency liabilities converted into local currency.
Chilean accounting standards dictate that conversion of debt from foreign to
local currency values be carried out using the exchange rate at the time at
which the balance sheet is reported. We augment this variable with a measure
of foreign currency assets (A*), which is the local currency value of fixed
assets that are indexed to a foreign currency instead of the local CPI, and
the nominal value of outstanding currency derivatives contracts with domestic
banks. To our knowledge, this is the first comprehensive dataset of emerging
market firms to include information on the currency composition of both sides
of the balance sheet.
One of the main questions we seek to answer in this paper is whether firms
match the currency composition of assets and liabilities. To answer this
question, we construct additional variables that proxy for α. The first is a
tradable dummy, that takes a value of one for firms in agriculture,
manufacturing, and mining and zero otherwise. Data on the sector composition
of output is reported in the FECU, and we also add firm-level data on FOB
export shipments collected from the Chilean Customs Office. We convert the
export data from dollars to pesos using the year-end exchange rate.
To explore the relation between investment and currency exposure, we
control for additional determinants of investment. The first of these is
earnings, defined as net operational earnings plus depreciation. Since we
wish to identify the effects of leverage (in particular, leverage in dollars)
on investment, we follow Lang, Ofek, and Stulz (1996) in using a measure of
earnings that does not depend on the firm's debt choice. This measure of cash
flow also excludes gains (or losses) from exchange rate changes, which allows
us to isolate the effects of exchange rate fluctuations on revenues and costs
from its effects on the valuation of assets and liabilities.
Some of our specifications include measures of the ratio of the book to
market value of assets and average Q ratios as control variables. Both of
these require data on market capitalization. We obtain this data directly
from the Chilean stock exchange. In all cases, the values we use correspond
to closing prices and outstanding shares in December.
                        
6. This database is part of a broader effort by the IDB to put together data on firm-level
currency composition of liabilities. For more details, see Galindo, Panizza, and Schiantarelli
(2003).7
Data on the use of derivatives at the firm level is scarce in the
literature in general, mostly because regulatory entities have only recently
imposed the obligation to report this kind of transaction. Chile is no
exception. Homogeneous data on derivative use from the notes to the financial
statements is only available since 2001.
7 To overcome this limitation, we
obtained access to an additional source of derivative data: the register of
notional values of foreign currency derivatives outstanding with Chilean
banks (F*). The main advantage of this series is that it is available since
1993. On the other hand, derivative transactions that do not include a
domestic bank are excluded. This seems to be a fairly minor problem in our
sample. Differences in 2001 and 2002 between the nominal amounts reported by
firms in the notes to their financial statements and the notional amounts
reported by banks are minimal.
Although we use the longer derivatives series from the Central Bank of
Chile in all of the regressions, the notes to the financial statements
provide interesting additional information on the use of currency derivatives
in Chile in. The notes provide contract-by-contract information for all
derivative transactions, covering all derivative instruments and underlying
assets. Based on the data for the period 2001–02, we observe three important
stylized facts. First, Chilean firms use derivatives contracts primarily to
cover exchange rate exposure. In fact, 73 percent of the total number of
contracts reported in the period (385) corresponds to foreign currency
contracts. Second, the most common instrument used to cover exchange rate
risk is the forward. If we restrict our sample to foreign currency contracts,
86 percent are forwards contracts. Third, derivatives contracts are
established over relatively short periods, with an average duration of less
than one year (ten months).
Finally, we build four indicator variables to control for differences in
firm ownership. The variable ADR measures whether the firm's stock trades on
a U.S. stock exchange in the form of American depositary receipts (ADRs) in
any given year. The variable GRUPO is a dummy variable that indicates whether
a firm was part of a conglomerate (as defined by the SVS) in 2003. AFP is
dummy variable that takes the value of one if the Chilean pension fund
administrators (AFPs) may hold stock from the firm without restrictions. We
construct the variable using information provided by the Superintendcy of
Pension Fund Administrators (the Superintencia de Administradores de Fondos
de Pension, or SAFP). We exclude the stocks of financial intermediaries such
as banks, pension funds, insurance companies, mutual fund administrators, and
investment funds administrators on the stock exchange. The last of the
ownership variables is FOREIGN, a dummy variable for firms controlled by
foreign multinationals. This variable is constructed in two steps. First, we
pooled the most recent information from the SVS, Economática, and Worldscope
on shareholder composition. We then used Lexis Nexis, the corporate
affiliations Database, and the Mergers and Acquisitions Database to cross-
check the nationality of the main shareholder or parent company. Of these
four variables, all but GRUPO are time varying.
We modify all accounting variables in the followings three ways. First, we
inflate or deflate our data to 1996 values using December-to-December changes
in the consumer price index. Second, we drop all firm-year observations if
the accounting data are not self-consistent, because data on foreign currency
liabilities and assets are inputted by hand. In particular, we drop
                        
7. In October 2000, the SVS modified the regulations that define how to report derivative
transactions in the complementary notes to the balance sheet data. In the new norm, the SVS
explicitly clarifies the obligation to report derivatives and identifies which information to
disclose. Before 2000, the norm was not clear enough to ensure that every single transaction
would be informed, leaving this decision up to the firm. The data that comes from the
complementary notes is thus trustworthy only since 2001.8
observations if the ratios of dollar debt over total liabilities, dollar
assets over total assets, exports over total sales, and short-term
liabilities over total liabilities are outside the range (–0.1, 1.1). We also
drop observations if the ratio of forward position over total assets is
outside the range (–1.1, 1.1). Finally, we drop outliers of our key left-
hand-side and right-hand-side variables. To do so, we construct a z score
using the sample mean and standard deviation, and we then drop firm-year
observations that have |z| > 2.
Because we are interested in the effects of a devaluation on firms holding
dollar debt, in the analysis below we interact D*, A*, and F* with changes in
the real exchange rate, ∆e. Our definition of e (the nominal exchange rate
against the U.S. dollar, scaled by the local CPI) is consistent with the
inflation adjustments described above. In all the specifications we report,
we measure ∆e as the log change in the real exchange rate between Decembers
of successive years. Using e on inflation-adjusted values of debt is
equivalent to using the nominal exchange rate on current values. According to
this definition, a devaluation leads to a higher value of e.
4. THE EFFECTS OF CURRENCY EXPOSURE ON FIRM PERFORMANCE
Our empirical specification in this section can be motivated with a simple
framework in which the optimal stock of capital is a function of the real
exchange rate (due to the competitiveness effect) and the real value of
previous-period liabilities (due to a balance sheet effect). Specifically,







where α measures the elasticity of kt* to the real exchange rate, θ represents
the elasticity of the log of the optimal capital stock to leverage, and Pt is
the real (inflation-adjusted) value of previous-period liabilities, which
serves as a proxy for net worth. In the presence of quadratic adjustment
costs, investment (It) will be a fraction (λ) of the gap between the
frictionless capital stock and lagged capital, so that





t−1 ( ).  (2)
The key mechanism we wish to test is how a depreciation alters investment
by inflating the domestic-currency value of debt. To incorporate this
mechanism in the previous equation, consider that the real value of previous-
period liabilities is given by







,   (3)
where D*t–1 is lagged dollar debt and ∆et the log change in the real exchange
rate. The real value of the firm's debt rises if it holds foreign currency
debt and the exchange rate goes up faster than the domestic-price level. This
is, of course, a purely mechanical effect.
Our basic empirical specification (for firm i in year t) follows directly
from equations 2 and 3:9
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We estimate versions of equation 4 on our sample of firms for the period
1995–2003. The key explanatory variable in our analysis is the interaction of
lagged dollar debt, D*i,t–1, with the log change in the real exchange rate, ∆et.
We can interpret the estimated coefficient on this interaction in two ways.
The first, which follows directly from the framework presented in this
section, is the effect of exogenous changes in the real value of total
liabilities on firm investment. The second follows from a difference in
difference approach, in which the estimated coefficient on the interaction
between lagged dollar debt and the change in the real exchange rate (D*i,t–1 •
∆et) indicates whether firms holding dollar liabilities invest significantly
less than their counterparts in periods following a devaluation.
In addition to the (D*i,t–1 • ∆et) interaction, we include lagged foreign-
currency-denominated debt to absorb any preexisting differences among firms
with different levels of dollar indebtedness. Such differences might have
prevailed in the absence of movements in the real exchange rate(for example,
if expanding firms were more likely to issue dollar debt than stagnant ones).
We also include sets of year and firm-specific dummies, yt and ωi. The year
dummies capture aggregate shocks common to all firms in our sample, including
changes in the real exchange rate. The firm-level dummies capture time-
invariant differences across firms in the optimal level of capital. Finally,
we include a series of proxies for αi, the elasticity of k* to the real
exchange rate. We discuss these proxies and additional controls below.
4.1 Main Results
Table 2 presents estimates of the reduced effect on investment of holding
dollar debt during a depreciation. The key variable here is the interaction
between lagged dollar debt and the change in the real exchange rate. This
interaction will indicate whether firms holding dollar debt invest relatively
less that those holding peso debt in periods following a depreciation.
[table 2 about here]
The sample covers the period 1995–2003. It includes two large depreciations
in 1999 and 2001 (both approximately 10 percent in real terms) and a large
appreciation in 2003. In addition, the levels of foreign currency debt
exhibit substantial cross-firm variation, which allows us to identify
differential responses of firms to a depreciation (or appreciation).
All specifications include firm fixed effects to control for time-invariant
firm differences in the optimal capital stock, as well as year dummies to
capture the shocks common to all firms. Following equation 4, we also include
the lagged dollarization ratio to control for previous-period differences in
firms with higher or lower dollar debt. Lagged total leverage is included as
an additional control.
Column 1 includes only the interaction between dollar debt and the change
in the real exchange rate (D* • ∆e). As in previous studies for Chile, the
estimated coefficient is not negative: firms with more dollar debt do not
invest relatively less in periods following a depreciation. At the same time,
the estimated coefficient on lagged leverage is negative as expected,
suggesting a negative balance sheet effect from outstanding debt commitments.
As discussed above, the estimated coefficient on (D* • ∆e) will be biased
upwards if firms holding dollar debt also see their current and future10
profits expand following a depreciation. To control for this bias, columns 2
through 4 include interactions between changes in the real exchange rate and
two proxies for the elasticity of income to the real exchange rate α: the
ratio of exports over assets and a dummy for firms in the tradable sector. In
both cases the estimated coefficient on the interaction term is positive—
significantly so in the case of the tradable dummy interaction. The estimated
coefficient on (D*  •  ∆e) remains insignificant, although marginally more
negative that in column 1.
The discussion so far in this section, and indeed in most of the empirical
literature on firm-level currency balance sheet effects, focuses on dollar
debt as the only mechanism through which a change in e can have balance sheet
effects. By doing so, we are ignoring the fact that firms may also hold
dollar-denominated assets, such as current assets in a foreign bank or
offshore investments, and that the inflated value of these sources of income
following a depreciation will offset the negative balance sheet effect of
dollar liabilities. This is a necessary simplification in many cases given
the absence of data on the currency composition of assets, but it can
introduce substantial biases into the estimation of the balance sheet effects
of a depreciation in a country such as Chile, where domestic firms hold
significant foreign assets. In our sample, the average ratio of dollar assets
to total assets is 5.8 percent, which is very close to the 9.3 percent
average of dollar liabilities.
With this in mind, we include an additional interaction between dollar
assets and the change in the real exchange rate (A* • ∆e) (see columns 5 and
6). As expected, the coefficient on the interaction is positive, since firms
holding dollar assets see their fixed capital investment go up by relatively
more than firms holding only peso assets. This, in itself, suggests a balance
sheet effect: firms whose liabilities fall relative to total assets are
perceived as less risky, face a lower cost of external finance, and
consequently have a higher optimal capital level than do firms with a stable
or rising ratio of liabilities to total assets.
Once the effect of (A* • ∆e) is considered, the estimated coefficient on
(D* • ∆e) falls, becoming negative and significant. This confirms our prior:
the insignificant coefficient on (D* • ∆e) in column 1, and in many of the
empirical papers so far, is due to omitted variables that are positively
correlated with dollar debt. The reason is matching. Firms that hold dollar
debt also have dollar assets (which offsets the balance sheet effect) and
export a larger share of their output (which also offsets the negative
balance sheet effect).
Finally, we control for differential effects of changes in the exchange
rate on firm cash flow that are not captured by the interactions between
tradable sectors and the exchange rate and exporting firms and the exchange
rate. The specification reported in column 7 includes a measure of cash flow
from operations. As expected, the cash flow variable is positive and highly
significant, measuring relaxed credit constraints stemming from improved net
worth and changes in the marginal product of capital.
Our results presented thus far suggest, first, that firms match the
currency composition of their income and assets with that of their
liabilities. As a result, those firms holding dollar debt during a
depreciation see the value of their profits and assets expand in line with
the value of their liabilities. The negative balance sheet effect of the
exchange rate on debt is offset by the positive balance sheet effect of the
exchange rate on assets and profits. Second, our results suggest substantial
balance sheet effects: exogenous changes in leverage brought about by
inflated peso values of debt have significant effects on investment. In our
sample, the investment-to-asset ratio of firms holding 50 percent of their11
debt in foreign currency is 5 percent of assets lower that their peso-
indebted counterparts following a 20 percent real depreciation (similar to
the 2001 depreciation in Chile). This difference is sizeable considering a
sample mean of 4 percent. Third, from a measurement perspective, these result
highlight the importance of having a measure of total balance sheet exposure
to determine the effect of a depreciation in investment and output.
The Chilean derivatives market, in particular the market for currency
derivatives, has expanded substantially in recent years. Although average net
positions are still small in relation to total assets, they are no longer
negligible, and in the case of some firms, they substantially alter the level
of net (or uncovered) dollar debt. To explore the effects of these derivative
positions on firm-level investment, column 8 includes an interaction between
the real depreciation and net foreign exchange derivative position over
assets in the previous period (F* • ∆e). The estimated coefficient in positive
and significant, meaning that in periods following a depreciation, firms
holding long foreign exchange derivative positions invest relatively more
than firms that do not.
Arguably, what matters for the effect of derivatives on output is not the
total change in the real exchange rate, but the deviation from the change
preestablished in the contract. We address this concern by using interest
rate differentials to construct a measure of deviations of realized
depreciation from the depreciation implicit in the forward contract, ∆e
u.
Assuming covered interest parity,








where rt–1 is the rate on UF-indexed debt for 90–365 days and r*t–1 is the
dollar lending rate in the domestic financial system for the same period.
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According to this construction, most of the large depreciations were
unexpected, even the 1999 depreciation. We therefore do not expect our
results to vary substantially when we include an interaction of derivative
positions with ∆et
u. Indeed, the estimated coefficient (reported in column 9)
is very similar to our previous result using total exchange rate movements.
A peculiarity of Chilean accounting norms is that certain firms are allowed
to keep their accounts in dollars. Because these firms are allowed to revalue
their fixed assets by changes in the nominal exchange rate, part of our
measure of investment may simply be driven by changes in the prices of
preinstalled assets. To correct for this, we introduce an interaction between
the lagged capital stock and the change in the real exchange rate for those
firms with dollar accounting (see column 10). This component controls for the
effects of mechanical revaluations on investment. The estimated coefficient
on the (A* • ∆e) interaction falls considerably, but it is still significant.
The estimated coefficient on the (D* • ∆e) interaction remains negative and
statistically significant.
The absolute value of the estimated coefficients on dollar debt, dollar
assets, and currency derivatives are similar, and an F test fails to reject
the hypothesis that all three coefficients are equal. We thus build an
accounting measure of currency mismatch (E*), equal to dollar debt net of
assets and the net long position in foreign exchange derivatives E* = D* –
 A* – F*. In column 11, we repeat our baseline estimation of investment and
include an interaction between exposure and changes in the real exchange rate
(E* • ∆e). As expected, the estimated coefficient on the interaction (E* • ∆e)
                        
8. The Unidad de Fomento (UF) is an inflation-indexed unit of account that is commonly used
in Chilean financial transactions.12
is negative and significant at conventional confidence level. The estimated
coefficient implies that a difference in exposure of 50 percent of assets
will lead (all things equal) to nearly 3 percent lower investment if the
currency depreciates by 20 percent.
Finally, in column 12 we deviate from the difference-in-differences
approach we have followed so far and estimate an empirical specification that
follows directly from equation 4. To do so, we include the lagged capital
stock. The main result remains unchanged: the estimated coefficient on (E* •
∆e) is negative and significant. As expected, the estimated coefficient on
lagged capital stock is negative and significant. We use the specification
from column 12 as our baseline result in the tables that follow.
Summing up, we find evidence of sizeable balance sheet effects and of firm-
level matching. These results are robust to a series of alternative
specifications and firm level controls.
9
4.2 Sensitivity Analysis
By focusing exclusively on exchange rate fluctuations, we have ignored the
fact that many of the exchange rate changes in our sample occur
simultaneously with changes in the supply (and cost) of foreign and domestic
credit. For example, firms holding dollar debt might be less sensitive to
changes in domestic interest rates than firms holding peso liabilities. If
domestic rates rise in periods of a depreciation because the Central Bank is
defending the currency, then our coefficient on the (E*  •  ∆e) interaction
would be biased upward (toward zero). Alternatively, the large negative
coefficient on the (E*  •  ∆e) interaction could be the result of rising
external capital costs and a tightening of foreign credit constraints that
coincide with periods of depreciation.
Furthermore, exposure to exchange rate fluctuations is by no means the only
aggregate shock that affects firm output and investment decisions. It is
therefore informative to see how aggregate credit shocks (domestic and
foreign) have differential effects on firms with different financial
structures. To control for changing credit conditions, we estimate the
investment regressions including an indicator of domestic credit conditions
(namely, the domestic interest rate) and an indicator of external credit
conditions (the return on the Emerging Market Bond Index, or EMBI, bond
basket). In each case, we interact the macroeconomic variable with our
measure of currency exposure and the ratio of dollar debt to total assets. We
also interact the macroeconomic variables with a measure of the firm's
maturity mismatch.
10 The risk of maturity mismatch for emerging market firms
has received almost as much attention in recent years as the risk of currency
mismatch. Although business assets are (stereotypically) installed for the
long term and are therefore illiquid, capital market frictions and
distortions may induce firms to issue debt with relatively short maturity.
Should aggregate credit conditions shift suddenly, these firms would be
                        
9. In addition to the specification reported here, we carried out the following additional
robustness tests: estimates using lagged investment and interaction of ∆ln(real exchange rate)
with exports and tradables; estimates using lagged investment and firm fixed effects based on the
Arellano-Bond methodology; estimates that drop all observations in which E* is zero, to control
for right-hand-side variable censoring bias. In all cases, our main results remain qualitatively
unchanged.
10. We tested the robustness of our results to a series of additional interactions (not
report in the table). At the firm level we used short term debt, log(assets), and total leverage.
At the macroeconomic level, we used net capital inflows, changes in the stock of bank loans to
the private sector, a dummy for sudden stops (as defined by Calvo, Izquierdo, and Mejía, 2004),
and London interbank offered rates (LIBOR) on dollar loans. These results are available on
request.13
unable to renew their debt and thus might have to curtail investment and
perhaps liquidate.
Table 3 shows the results obtained for investment after including aggregate
credit variables. The (E* • ∆e) interaction is significant and negative even
after we include this additional set of controls. Moreover, the point
estimates change only slightly. Most of the additional coefficients estimated
have the expected signs, but they are not significant at conventional
confidence levels. We do, however, obtain interesting results for the
interactions with the maturity mismatch variable. All things equal, firms
with more short-term debt relative to short-term assets react more strongly
to hikes in the domestic interest rates than do firms with a lower ratio.
[table 3 about here]
4.2.1 Differential balance sheet effects across firms
The sample-average effect presented above was strongly negative, but this
might mask differences in balance sheet effects across groups of firms.
Indeed, we would expect the estimated coefficient on the (E* • ∆e) interaction
to be relatively smaller (in absolute terms) for firms that we would consider
a priori less credit constrained or financially stronger.
Table 4 partitions the sample by predetermined firm characteristics. Column
1 replicates our baseline results, while columns 2 through 5 introduce an
additional interaction between the (E*  •  ∆e) variable and one of four
indicator variables. The first of these is a dummy that takes a value of one
for firms that are eligible to be included in the AFP portfolio. Two previous
studies for Chilean firms have found that investment by firms in this
category is less correlated with cash flow and less sensitive to leverage
than is the investment of firms that are not in the AFP portfolios (Medina
and Valdés, 1998; Gallego and Loayza, 2000). The additional three dummy
variables were described above: a dummy for foreign ownership, a dummy for
firms with ADRs, and a dummy for firms belonging to a financial
conglomerate.
11 All the specifications also include the indicator variable,
its interaction with total leverage, and its interaction with ∆e, although
only the coefficients on (E* • ∆e) and the triple interaction are reported.
Structuring the specification in this manner allows us to estimate how the
effect of (E* • ∆e) among the indicated set of firms differs from the rest of
the sample.
[table 4 about here]
When we interact our measure of exposure with the AFP dummy and the ADR
dummy, the estimated coefficient is positive, suggesting that less credit
constrained firms are less vulnerable to the balance sheet effects of
currency exposure. The interaction has the opposite sign, however, in the
case of the foreign and financial conglomerate dummies. These regressions
have been estimated very imprecisely, so these findings must be taken with
caution. We have no explanation for the results of either the foreign dummy
or the financial conglomerate dummy.
                        
11. We exclude those periods from the sample in which a firm changes categories. This
explains the smaller sample than in previous specifications.14
5. FOREIGN CURRENCY HEDGING BY CHILEAN NONFINANCIAL FIRMS
The previous section provides empirical support of a strong balance sheet
effect arising from the interaction of foreign debt and exchange rate
depreciations after controlling for differences in the composition of the
balance sheet and net operational income. The evidence also suggests that
Chilean nonfinancial corporations actively use foreign debt as a hedge for
other sources of foreign currency exposure. This section studies the hedging
behavior of Chilean firms during the sample period. We estimate a set of
regressions to examine the extent of currency matching in our sample and the
relation between hedging and those variables identified in the corporate
finance literature to explain risk aversion in nonfinancial corporations.
5.1 Dollar Debt and Productive Structure
In this section, we evaluate the first prediction of the mean variance
framework we presented in the previous section—namely, that firms match the
currency composition of their liabilities with that of their assets and
income. To do so, we estimate the following equation on pooled firm-level
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in which for firm i in period t,  βit is a measure of dollar debt to total
assets and αit is the set of variables introduced in the previous section that
proxy for the elasticity of firm income to the real exchange rate
(specifically, direct exports as a share of total sales; a dummy variable
that takes a value of one if the firm is in the agriculture, mining, or
manufacturing sector; and the ratio of dollar-denominated assets to total
assets).
Table 5 reports the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation for the ratio
of dollar debt to assets. Column 1 includes the tradable dummy (agriculture,
mining, or manufacturing), while column 2 includes a set of dummies for one-
digit International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) sectors (not
reported). Because βit is left-hand censored at zero, we also estimate
equation 5 using a Tobit method (see columns 3 and 4). In all four
specifications, the estimated coefficients on exports and dollar assets are
positive and highly significant. The coefficients are also sizeable. Using
the estimated coefficients from column 1, we find that the fraction of
dollar-denominated liabilities over assets is 6.5 percent higher in firms
that export 50 percent of their output than in firms that sell their output
domestically. Similarly, firms with a 50 percent share of dollar-denominated
assets have, on average, ratios of dollar debt to assets that are 13 percent
higher than firms with primarily peso- or UF-denominated debt. The tradable
dummy is positive and significant in column 3: even after we control for
dollar assets and exports, dollar liabilities are 3 percent higher (as a
percent of total assets) than in nontradable sectors.
[table 5 about here]
We obtain qualitatively identical results when we measure β as the ratio of
dollar debt to total debt (in columns 5 through 8), when we replace β with an
indicator variable for firms that hold dollar debt (column 9 and 10), and15
when we measure β as dollar debt over assets net of derivative positions
(columns 11 and 12).
In sum, we find strong evidence that firms match the currency composition
of their debt with that of their accounting assets and income streams.
Effective foreign currency exposure is therefore substantially smaller than
what foreign currency debt suggests, so that in periods of depreciation we
expect the negative balance sheet effects of dollar debt to be offset (or
reversed) by the positive balance sheet effects of dollar assets and income.
5.2 Structural Determinants of Derivative Use
What ultimately matters for firm performance is the net exposure to
exchange rate shocks. Nevertheless, in our sample derivative positions are
relatively small vis-à-vis total dollar debt, so the results for net dollar
debt (dollar debt net of long foreign exchange derivative positions) are
driven to a large extent by the debt component. We therefore present some
additional results for the determinants of derivative use in table 6. In
columns 1 and 2, the left-hand-side variable is the nominal value of net
derivative positions over total assets; in columns 3 and 4, the left-hand-
side variable is an indicator variable for firms holding any form of foreign
exchange derivative.
[table 6 about here]
The estimated coefficient on dollar debt is positive and significant at
conventional confidence levels in all specifications. Firms holding dollar
debt hold larger long positions in foreign exchange derivatives and are, in
turn, more likely to hold any form of foreign exchange derivative than firms
that do not hold dollar debt. On the other hand, the estimated coefficients
on the ratio of exports to sales and the ratio of dollar assets to total
assets are negative and significant only in columns 1 and 2. When we control
for dollar debt, firms exporting a large share of their sales and firms with
a large share of dollar-denominated assets hold significantly lower long
derivative positions. The estimated coefficients on exports and dollar assets
are not significant in columns 3 and 4 since long positions are treated
identically to short positions in the dummy variable.
Hence, firms in our sample use derivatives as a complement to real hedges.
That is, firms use derivatives to offset the balance sheet risk of dollar
debt when their income is not correlated with the real exchange rate.
5.3 Currency Exposure and Risk Aversion
If we control for α and the relative cost of domestic and foreign credit
(τ + ε), the level of exposure to currency shocks should be lower for more
risk-averse firms than for risk-loving firms (that is, µ should be higher). To
test this prediction empirically, we estimate a measure of excess currency
exposure for firms over the period 2000–02. We do this in two stages. In the
first, we estimate a regression of dollar debt against our proxies for α
(exports, sector, and dollar assets) and against the measure of µ. The first
terms capture matching; the second term captures possible correlations
between  µ and ε, the idiosyncratic component of expected interest. In the
second stage, we calculate the absolute deviations between the fitted values
from the first stage and observed net dollar debt (net of derivatives), and
we then regress them on µ. Table 7 reports the estimated coefficients for the
second stage of this estimation for data pooled over the period 2000–02. Each16
cell reports the estimated coefficient and standard error of univariate
regressions of excess net dollar debt against the respective measure of risk
aversion or, in the case of the liquidity and investment opportunities
variables, the coefficients from a regression that also includes the log of
total assets.
[table 7 about here]
The first section of table 7 reports the estimated coefficients for
variables we believe a priori to be correlated with credit constraints. The
first is firm size. A series of empirical studies argues that large firms are
less credit constrained than small firms because of fixed costs in
information disclosure. The estimated coefficient is consistent with this
hypothesis: large firms hold net foreign debt positions that are, on average,
further from the matching composition than small firms, and these firms are
therefore more exposed (in terms of their balance sheet, at least) than small
firms. This result is also consistent with the effect of size limitations in
the domestic market.
The next two variables measure foreign ownership, either via the U.S. stock
market (in the case of firms issuing ADRs) or directly, as part of a foreign
conglomerate (in the case of firms owned by foreign corporations). In both
cases we estimate a positive and significant coefficient, which suggests that
these firms are less credit constrained that their counterparts.
Several empirical papers for Chile group Chilean firms according to their
eligibility for pension fund investment, the idea being that firms eligible
for AFP portfolios will be less credit constrained than ineligible firms. For
a start, firms eligible for AFP investment can access a larger pool of
accumulated wealth. In addition, if there are fixed costs to monitoring, then
AFP-eligible firms will be closely monitored by the investment managers in
the AFPs, reducing the degree of information asymmetry. With this in mind, we
include a dummy variable for firms classified by the SAFP as eligible for AFP
investment as a proxy for µ.
Finally, we include the GRUPO dummy, for firms belonging to financial
conglomerates. We find a positive and significant coefficient, as was the
case for the ADR, foreign ownership, and AFP dummies.
The next section of table 7 includes variables that measure liquidity risk.
As discussed above, we expect firms with high liquidity risk to minimize
exposure to currency fluctuations. However, the estimated coefficients for
the coverage ratio is not significant at conventional confidence levels, and
the estimated coefficient of the current ratio is the opposite of what we
expect. These results are robust to using alternative liquidity measures (not
reported in the table), including the quick ratio, total leverage, short-term
debt, and the maturity mismatch. Although the approach we follow here is
relatively standard in the corporate finance literature, these puzzling
results suggest that our specification suffers from endogeneity issues.
Lagging the right-hand-side variable, as we do in this table, only addresses
part of the problem. For example, an omitted firm-level variable that is
negatively correlated with credit constraints would drive up leverage and at
the same time lead to higher dollar exposure, as we find in table.
Finally, the last part of table 7 shows the results for two variables that
proxy for investment opportunities: a lagged moving average of investment
over assets and the log of the market-to-book ratio. The sample drops
significantly once the market-to-book variable is included because a
substantial share of our firms are not listed. We fail to find a
statistically significant effect of lagged investment, but the estimated
coefficient on the market-to-book ratio is negative and significant, as
expected.17
6. EXCHANGE RATE REGIME, NET EXPOSURES, AND THE BALANCE SHEET EFFECT
In this section, we focus on the time dimension of our panel of firms to
examine the impact of the adoption of a floating exchange rate regime in the
late 1990s on currency mismatches and the size of the balance sheet effect
among Chilean firms.
This shift in the policy regime affected the two macroeconomic variables
that explain currency mismatches in the mean-variance framework: interest
rate differentials and exchange rate volatility. The economywide
differentials between domestic and foreign borrowing costs declined, while
exchange rate volatility increased. In the period prior to 1998, the
annualized standard deviation of monthly depreciations of the dollar-UF
exchange rate was 2.4 percent. It doubled to 4.4 percent after the floating
of the peso in September 1999 (see table 8).
[table 8 about here]
  Accordingly, we expect that the new policy regime created greater
incentives for firms to hedge and reduce their currency risk exposures. We
further expect the reduction to be sharper in firms that have relatively weak
balance sheets and are likely to face capital market imperfections and
financial constraints. Both predictions imply that the empirical relevance of
the adverse effect of exchange rate depreciations on balance sheets should
have declined in Chile after 1999.
6.1 Floating and Currency Risk Exposure in Chilean Firms
In this subsection, we review evidence on the evolution of currency risk
exposure across firms in our sample. We begin with a look at different
average measures of exposure to foreign exchange risk, and then we reestimate
the matching regressions of the previous section to examine changes in the
behavior of firms after the shift to the floating exchange regime.
All aggregate measures of foreign exchange exposure show a similar pattern
(see figure 1): an initial phase of rising currency mismatches from 1995 to
1998, a significant drop through 1999 and 2000, and relative stability in the
following two years. Dollar debt increased between 1995 an 1998 from 20
percent of total liabilities to 27 percent, but in the following two years it
fell back to 20 percent of total liabilities (18 percent when adjusted for
the depreciation of the real exchange rate) and then stayed at that level.
Similarly, hedging activity increased sharply during 1998 and 1999 and then
stabilized. Firms net (and gross) positions on forward markets ere negligible
until 1997, after which the net positions increased sharply, reaching around
4 percent of total liabilities or 10 percent of foreign currency debt.
[figure 1 about here]
Similarly, an alternative measure of net accounting exposure in the balance
sheet of firms—namely, foreign currency debt adjusted for foreign currency
assets and derivatives—increased gradually from 1995 to 1997. It then started
to decline, quite sharply in the years 1999 and 2000, until becoming slightly
negative in the final years of our sample. Overall, the evolution of
aggregate measures of foreign exchange exposition in our sample of firms is
consistent with a reduction of exposure after the shift in the macroeconomic
policy regime.18
The empirical evidence on the differential behavior of firms before and
after the changes in the macroeconomic-policy regime is shown in table 9. We
reestimate regressions on the hedging behavior of firms, this time including
a time dummy for the period prior to the adoption of the floating exchange
rate regime and other reforms. Although changes in macroeconomic policies
were implemented in 1998 and 1999, we consider that some adjustment costs to
the composition of the balance sheet could lead to a lagged response of
firms. The dummy variable therefore covers 1995–98, and 1999 is excluded from
the sample.
[table 9 about here]
The results for all regressions indicate a significant drop in foreign
currency exposure or a significant increase in foreign currency hedging after
1999. The ratio of dollar debt to total assets declines significantly for all
firms, to around 20 percent of the pre-float exposure. The dollar debt ratio
adjusted for derivatives declines further, to around 35 percent of the pre-
float exposure, and the net accounting exposure disappears after 1999.
Similarly, the net derivative position increases significantly after 1999. As
shown in the graphs for the aggregate numbers, most of the action comes from
the reduction of foreign currency debt, with a smaller effect from the
increase in derivatives.
Because we have detected an increase in the volatility of the exchange rate
in the period after 1999, we expect the drop in the exposure to be larger for
firms with a more vulnerable financial condition. Firms are sampled according
to the variables identified in the previous section as measures of a firm’s
risk aversion. We then test for differences in the change of the foreign
exchange exposure after 1999. To measure foreign exchange exposure, we
replicate the methodology discussed in the previous section—that is, we
estimate the matching portfolio using the dollar assets, exports, and
tradable dummies, and we then estimate deviations from this portfolio. To
allow for changes across periods in this matching relation, we estimate the
first stage allowing for different coefficients across regimes. These
coefficients will capture the differences in levels of exposure we discussed
above. In the second stage, we interact the firm-level dummies we found to be
positively correlated with higher mismatches in the float period with the
pre-float dummy. We report these second stage results in table 10. The
estimated coefficients on the interactions are negative in all cases except
the AFP dummy, although only the interaction with the ADR dummy is
significant. This is contrary to what we expect.
[table 10 about here]
Thus far, we have attributed the fall in dollar debt or average exposure to
the shift in the macroeconomic policy regime and its impact on compressing
interest rate differentials and increasing exchange rate volatility. We have
not attempted to disentangle the effects of each of these components. To
begin decomposing these two macroeconomic effects, we reestimate our
regressions of firm hedging, incorporating the return on the EMBI bond index
as a measure of the cost of external finance and the average rate on one- to
three-year UF-denominated loans in the Chilean banking system as a measure of
the domestic interest rate.
12 We report the results of these estimates in
table 11. The estimated signs on the interest rate coefficients are as
expected, with dollar debt rising when domestic rates are high and falling
                        
12. We carried out these estimations with the LIBO and EMBI rates ex ante, with and without
the unremunerated reserve requirement over a two-year entry period; we obtained similar results.19
with the cost of external financing. As reported in column 2, we also obtain
a positive coefficient on the pre-float dummy, even after controlling for the
interest rates individually or (as in column 3) by the spread between the two
rates.
[table 11 about here]
The interest rate differentials provide an alternative way to validate the
a priori measures of credit constraints used in previous sections. One of the
predictions of the framework presented above is that interest rate
differentials have a large effect on currency exposure of firms that are less
risk averse. To test this hypothesis, we estimate interactions between the
interest rate differential and the measures of a priori credit constraints
that we found to be significant in explaining excess net dollar debt (or
exposure). In all cases, we obtain positive coefficients (as expected),
although these are only significant for the size variable. We thus find some
evidence that firms that are less risk averse respond the most to changes in
interest rate differentials, as the cost (in terms of financial distress or
missed investment opportunities) are lower.
A higher exchange rate volatility in the post-float period is a plausible
explanation for the positive coefficient on the pre-float dummy. However,
other economywide events occurring in the same period could also be driving
our results. An alternative hypothesis to explain why firms closed their
currency mismatches after 1998 would be that they faced an external liquidity
crunch during this period that pushed them to the local market, independently
of the shift in the policy regime and the measured interest rate spread. They
had no option but to close the currency mismatches because they could not
continue borrowing abroad.
We find no compelling evidence to argue that after 1998, either the Chilean
economy was liquidity constrained in international markets or that firms were
cut off from international credit. Indeed, in January 1999 the Government was
able to fund its fiscal deficit by taping into international markets with
spreads of 200 basis points, while risk premiums on private debt had returned
to 300 basis points in early 1999. Also, total private foreign debt of
nonfinancial firms continued to increase in 1998, 1999, and 2000, from US$21
billion to US$29.4 billion. After 2000, credit spreads continued to decline,
although private foreign debt of nonfinancial firms stabilized at US$ 29
billion.
7. CONCLUSIONS
This paper contributes to the existing empirical literature on the balance
sheet effects of currency mismatches in three ways. First, we assemble a new
firm-level database that allows us to build more comprehensive measures of
currency exposure. In addition to data on foreign currency debt, our dataset
incorporates data on firm-level exports, foreign currency assets, and foreign
currency derivative positions. This data should allow us to correct for the
omitted variables present in many of the previous studies of balance sheet
effects. Second, we explicitly look at differences in exposure across firm-
level variables that the corporate finance literature argues (or shows) to be
correlated with firm-level risk aversion. Finally, by looking at firm-level
data for Chile over the period 1995 to 2003, we are able to identify changes
in the level and distribution of dollar debt across two distinct policy
regimes. Before 1999, Chile had an exchange rate band and therefore an20
explicit commitment to exchange rate stability. After 1999, the Central Bank
allowed the exchange rate to float freely.
As in previous studies for Chile by Benavente, Johnson, and Morandé (2003)
and Fuentes (2003), we find that firms with higher dollar debt do not
underperform their peso counterparts in periods following a depreciation.
However, once we adequately control for differences in the currency
composition of assets and income and in net derivative positions, we find a
significant balance sheet effect. In other words, we find that currency
mismatches matter when they are correctly measured. We also find that
derivatives play a role in insulating firm-level investment from exchange
rate shocks and that the balance sheet effects are slightly smaller for firms
we categorize a priori as less credit constrained.
In line with previous firm-level studies, we find evidence of currency
matching in Chilean corporations. Firms in Chile appear to actively minimize
the risks associated with open currency positions and choose the currency
composition of their debt and their derivative positions accordingly. They do
this by matching the currency composition of their debt with that of their
income and assets and by taking on derivatives if no real hedge is available.
We also find that exposure—as measured by deviations of dollar-debt net of
derivatives from the levels predicted by a simple regression between debt,
assets, and exports—is negatively correlated with measures of credit
constraints (or firm risk aversion) and investment opportunities. Our results
on exposure suggest that the firms that are most exposed to currency risk are
better prepared to take this risk.
Finally, we find significant changes in the level of exposure after the
exchange rate was floated in 1999. This drop is significant even after we
control for a crude measure of interest rate differentials. We argue that one
possible interpretation of these results is that the higher exchange rate
variance affects the relative risk of domestic and foreign debt. This being
the case, the evidence suggests that floating exchange rate regimes would
reduce exposure by eliminating an implicit exchange rate insurance and
forcing firms to internalize exchange rate risk. More evidence from other
emerging market economies is needed to generalize this assertion.
REFERENCES
Aguiar, M. 2002. “Investment, Devaluation, and Foreign Currency Exposure: The
Case of Mexico.” University of Chicago, Graduate School of Business.
Mimeographed.
Allayannis, G., G., Brown, and L. Klapper. 2001. “Exchange Risk Management:
Evidence from East Asia.” Policy research working paper 2606, Washington:
World Bank.
Allayannis, G. and E. Ofek. 2001. “Exchange Rate Exposure, Hedging, and the
Use of Foreign Currency Derivatives.” Journal of International Money and
Finance 20(2): 273–96.
Allayannis, G. and J. Weston. 2001. “The Use of Foreign Currency Derivatives
and Firm Market Value.” Review of Financial Studies 14(1): 243–76.
Arteta, C. 2003. “Are Financially Dollarized Countries More Prone to Costly
Crises?” International finance discussion paper 763. Washington: Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Bartram, S., G. Brown, and F. Fhele. 2004. “International Evidence on
Financial Derivatives Usage.” University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill,
Kenan-Flagler Business School. Mimeographed.21
Benavente, J.M., C. Johnson, and F. Morandé. 2003. “Debt Composition and
Balance Sheet Effects of Exchange Rate Depreciations: A Firm-Level Analysis
for Chile.” Emerging Markets Review 4(4): 397–416.
Bleakley, H. and K. Cowan. 2005. “Dollar Debt and Devaluations: Much Ado
about Nothing?” Washington: InterAmerican Development Bank. Mimeographed.
Bonomo, M., B. Martins, and R. Pinto. 2003. “Debt Composition and Exchange
Rate Balance Sheet Effects in Brazil: A Firm Level Analysis.” Emerging
Markets Review 4(4): 368–96.
Calvo, G., A. Izquierdo, and L.F. Mejía. 2004. “On the Empirics of Sudden
Stops: The Relevance of Balance Sheet Effects.” Research working paper 509.
Washington: Inter-American Development Bank.
Céspedes, L.F. 2004. “Financial Frictions and Real Devaluations.” Santiago:
Central Bank of Chile. Mimeographed.
De Gregorio, J., S. Edwards, and R. Valdés. 2000. “Controls on Capital
Inflows: Do They Work?” Journal of Development Economics 63(1): 59–83.
Echeverry, J.C., L. Fergusson, R. Steiner, and C. Aguilar. 2003. “Dollar Debt
in Colombian Firms: Are Sinners Punished during Devaluations?” Emerging
Markets Review 4(4): 417–49.
Eichengreen, B., R. Hausmann, and U. Panizza. 2003. “The Pain of Original
Sin.” University of California at Berkeley, Harvard University, and Inter-
American Development Bank. Mimeographed.
Froot, K., D. Sharfstein, and J. Stein. 1993. “Risk Management: Coordinating
Corporate Investment and Financing Policies.” Journal of Finance 48(5):
1629–58.
Fuentes, M. 2003. “Dollarization of Financial Contracts: Evidence from
Chilean Firms.” University of California at Berkeley, Department of
Economics. Mimeographed.
Galindo, A., U. Panizza, and F. Schiantarelli. 2003. “Debt Composition and
Balance Sheet Effects of Currency Depreciation: A Summary of the Micro
Evidence.” Emerging Markets Review 4(4): 330–39.
Gallego, F. and N. Loayza. 2000. “Financial Structure in Chile: Macroeconomic
Developments and Microeconomic Effects.” Working paper 75. Santiago:
Central Bank of Chile.
Geczy C., B. Minton, and C. Schrand. 1997. “Why Firms Use Currency
Derivatives.” Journal of Finance 52(4): 1323–54.
Herrera, L.O. and R. Valdés. 2001. “The Effect of Capital Controls on
Interest Rate Differentials.” Journal of International Economics 53(2):
385–98.
Lang, L., E. Ofek, and R.M. Stulz. 1996. “Leverage, Investment, and Firm
Growth.” Journal of Financial Economics 40(1): 3–29.
Levy-Yeyati, E. 2003. “Financial Dollarization: Where Do We Stand?” Paper
prepared for the conference, Financial Dedollarization: Policy Options.
Inter-American Development Bank and World Bank, Washington, 1–2 Dcember.
———. 2005 (forthcoming). “Financial Dollarization: Evaluating the
Consequences.” Economic Policy.
Levy-Yeyati, E., F. Sturzenegger, and I. Reggio. 2003. “On the Endogeneity of
Exchange Rate Regimes.” Universidad Torcuato di Tella, Business School.
Mimeographed.
Luengnaruemitchai, P. 2004. “The Asian Crises and the Mystery of the Missing
Balance Sheet Effect.” University of California at Berkeley, Department of
Economics. Mimeographed.
McKinnon, R.I. and H. Pill. 1998. “The Overborrowing Syndrome: Are East Asian
Economies Different?” In Managing Capital Flows and Exchange Rates:
Perspectives from the Pacific Basin, edited by R. Glick, 322–55. Cambridge
University Press.22
Medina, J.P. and R. Valdés. 1998. “Flujo de caja y decisiones de inversión en
Chile: evidencia de sociedades anónimas abiertas.” Cuadernos de Economía
35(106): 301–23.
Myers, S. 1977. “Determinants of Corporate Borrowing.” Journal of Financial
Economics 5(2): 147–75.
Panizza, U., R. Hausmann, and E. Stein. 2001. “Why Do Countries Float the Way
They Float?” Journal of Development Economics 66(2): 387–414.
Pratap S., I. Lobato, and A. Somuano. 2003. “Debt Composition and Balance
Sheet Effects of Exchange Rate Volatility in Mexico: A Firm-Level






Investment in fixed capital over
lagged assets 1,326 0.038 0.149 –2.200 1.071
Dollar debt over lagged assets 1,183 0.093 0.139 0.000 1.013
I (firm has dollar debt) 1,179 0.651 0.476 0.000 1.000
Dollar assets over lagged assets 1,186 0.058 0.164 –0.029 1.008
Net foreign exchange derivatives
position over lagged assets 1,325 0.007 0.043 –0.153 0.562
I (firm has derivatives) 1,326 0.141 0.348 0.000 1.000
Exposure (dollar debt – forwards –
dollar assets) over lagged assets 1,181 0.027 0.169 –1.008 0.648
Cash flow over lagged assets 1,326 0.072 0.185 –1.584 3.209
Exports over lagged assets 1,309 0.053 0.156 0.000 1.379
Exports over sales 1,309 0.098 0.229 0.000 1.027
Lagged capital over assets 1,326 0.772 0.451 0.000 4.833Table 2. Effect of Exchange Rate Exposure on Investment, 1995–2003
a
Explanatory variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Interaction
Dollar debt x (∆ log real exchange











Dollar debt 0.014 0.015 0.026 0.025 0.021 0.032
(0.063) (0.059) (0.060) (0.057)
(0.060
) (0.058)










Exports x (log real exchange rate) 0.205 0.004
(0.179) (0.187)
Tradable x (log real exchange rate) 0.169*** 0.170*** 0.152***
(0.059) (0.061) (0.057)
Dollar assets 0.013 0.009
(0.029
) (0.029)







No. observations 1,326 1,326 1,326 1,326 1,326 1,326
R
2 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.27Table 2. Effect of Exchange Rate Exposure on Investment, 1995–2003 (cont.)
Explanatory variable (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Interaction








(0.201) (0.206) (0.208) (0.164)







Dollar debt 0.011 0.009 0.009 0.010
(0.043) (0.045) (0.045) (0.043)
Exposure –0.016 –0.018
(0.020) (0.023)
Total debt –0.099* –0.099* –0.099* –0.100* –0.096* –0.090*
(0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.056) (0.055) (0.049)
Control
Tradable x (log real exchange rate) 0.113** 0.113** 0.113**
0.110**
* 0.106** 0.117**
(0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.042) (0.042) (0.046)
Dollar assets 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.030
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.022)




(0.203) (0.202) (0.203) (0.117)
Cash flow from operations 0.324** 0.324** 0.324** 0.321** 0.322** 0.307**
(0.145) (0.145) (0.145) (0.148) (0.148) (0.132)
Net long derivative position 0.016 0.018 0.015
(0.062) (0.061) (0.060)
0.404* 0.382 Net long derivative pos.  x (∆ log
real exchange rate) (0.236) (0.256)
Net long derivative  x (∆ log real










* Lagged capital stock x (∆log real
exchange rate) x I (account US$) (0.185) (0.197) (0.171)
Summary statistic
No. observations 1,326 1,326 1,326 1,326 1,326 1,326
R
2 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.37 0.37 0.41
* Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
*** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on accounting data from SVS and macroeconomic data from various sources.
a. The dependent variable is the change in the CPI-adjusted stock of fixed capital. The regressions are variants of equation
4 in the text, using OLS and year fixed effects. All independent accounting variables (with the exception of cash flow from
operations) are once lagged. All accounting variables are scaled by once-lagged  total firm assets. I (account US$) is a dummy
for firms that carry their accounting in dollars. Exposure is the dollar debt net of derivatives and dollar assets. The baseline
real exchange rate is defined as the nominal peso-dollar exchange rate divided by the domestic CPI. Unexpected changes in the
real exchange rate are built assuming uncovered interest rate parity, as described in the text. Net derivative positions are the
notional values of currency derivative positions with domestic banks. For detailed sources and descriptions, see the appendix.
Standard errors adjusted for clustering by year are reported in parentheses.Table 3. Changes in Aggregate Credit Conditions
a
Explanatory variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Interaction
Exposure  x (∆ log real
exchange rate) –0.253*** –0.292** –0.248*** –0.267*** –0.283*** –0.291***
(0.081) (0.125) (0.084) (0.091) (0.100) (0.095)
Baseline control
Exposure 0.005 –0.065** –0.006 –0.007 –0.018 –0.019
(0.041) (0.033) (0.025) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023)
Cash flow from operations 0.307** 0.307** 0.308** 0.307** 0.307** 0.303**
(0.132) (0.132) (0.132) (0.132) (0.132) (0.133)
Tradable x (∆ log real
exchange rate) 0.118** 0.113** 0.116** 0.117** 0.111** 0.137***
(0.046) (0.047) (0.047) (0.046) (0.047) (0.049)
Lagged capital stock –0.168** –0.168** –0.169** –0.169** –0.171** –0.171**
(0.071) (0.071) (0.071) (0.071) (0.072) (0.072)
Total debt –0.09* –0.09* –0.087* –0.087* –0.106* –0.108*
(0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.056) (0.057)
Additional control
0.558*** 0.567*** 0.56*** 0.554*** 0.569*** 0.563*** Lagged capital stock x (∆ log
real exchange rate) x I
(account US$) (0.169) (0.169) (0.169) (0.173) (0.169) (0.164)
Exposure x EMBI yield –0.174
(0.296)
Exposure x domestic interest
rate 0.666
(0.494)
Dollar debt 0.025 –0.04
(0.070) (0.091)
Dollar debt x EMBI yield –0.406
(0.395)
Dollar debt x domestic
interest rate 0.151
(0.931)
Maturity mismatch –0.007 0.136***
(0.073) (0.045)
Maturity mismatch x EMBI
yield 0.291
(0.502)
–1.46*** Maturity mismatch x domestic
interest rate (0.552)
Summary statistic
No. observations 1,326 1,326 1,326 1,326 1,326 1,326
R
2 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41
* Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
*** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on accounting data from SVS and macroeconomic data from various sources.
a. The dependent variable is the change in the CPI-adjusted stock of fixed capital. All regressions are estimated using OLS,
with year fixed effects. All independent accounting variables (with the exception of cash flow from operations) are once lagged.
All accounting variables are scaled by once-lagged total firm assets. Exposure is dollar debt net of derivatives and dollar
assets.  I (account US$) is a dummy for firms that carry their accounting in dollars. Maturity mismatch is defined as the
difference between current liabilities and current assets, scaled by total assets. Macroeconomic variables (the real exchange
rate and domestic and international interest rates) are from the current period (that is, concurrent with the left-hand-side
investment variable). The real exchange rate is defined as the nominal exchange rate divided by the domestic CPI. The domesticinterest rate is the three-month rate of return on 30- to 89-day UF-denominated loans in the domestic financial system. For
detailed sources and descriptions, see the appendix. Standard errors adjusted for clustering by year are reported in parentheses.Table 4. Effect of Exposure across Firm Categories
a
Explanatory variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Exposure x ∆ log real exchange
rate) –0.287*** –0.451 –0.293* –0.310** 0.250
(0.092) (0.295) (0.154) (0.123) (0.369)
Exposure –0.023 –0.026 –0.025 –0.023 –0.025
(0.023) (0.033) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024)
Total debt –0.089* –0.090 –0.091* –0.093* –0.091*
(0.049) (0.055) (0.050) (0.049) (0.050)
Cash flow from operations 0.309** 0.275** 0.307** 0.308** 0.308**
(0.131) (0.135) (0.132) (0.132) (0.131)
Lagged capital stock –0.167** –0.179** –0.168** –0.169** –0.167**
(0.071) (0.091) (0.071) (0.072) (0.071)
0.577*** 0.542** 0.582*** 0.553*** 0.533*** Lagged capital stock x (∆ log real
exchange rate) x I (account US$) (0.179) (0.211) (0.186) (0.188) (0.182)
I (AFP) x exposure  x ∆ log real
exchange rate) 0.343
(0.394)
–0.057 I (foreign) x exposure  x (∆ log
real exchange rate) (0.606)
I (ADR) x exposure  x (∆ log real
exchange rate) 0.185
(0.452)
–0.750 I (GRUPO) x exposure  x (∆ log real
exchange rate) (0.559)
Summary statistic
No. observations 1,326 1,102 1,323 1,308 1,326
R
2 0.41 0.4 0.41 0.41 0.41
* Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
*** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on accounting data from SVS and macroeconomic data from various sources.
a. The dependent variable is the change in the CPI-adjusted stock of fixed capital. All regressions are estimated using OLS,
with year fixed effects. All independent accounting variables (with the exception of cash flow from operations) are once lagged.
All accounting variables are scaled by once-lagged total firm assets. Exposure is dollar debt net of derivatives and dollar
assets.  I (account US$) is a dummy for firms that carry their accounting in dollars, I (AFP) is a dummy variable for firms
eligible to be included in the portfolio of pension fund regulators, I (foreign) is a dummy for firms owned by foreign
corporations, I (ADR) is a dummy for firms listing ADRs on the New York Stock Exchange, and I (GRUPO) is a dummy for firms
belonging to a conglomerate in 2002 as defined by the SVS. The baseline real exchange rate is defined as the nominal peso-dollar
exchange rate divided by the domestic CPI. The number of observations changes because periods in which firms change categories
are excluded from the sample. Standard errors adjusted for clustering by year are reported in parentheses.Table 5. Dollar Debt and Production Structure, 1996–2002
a




variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
0.269*** 0.264*** 0.330*** 0.344*** 0.586*** 0.629*** 0.702*** 0.788*** 7.466*** 8.127*** 0.274*** 0.269*** Dollar assets /
total assets (0.052) (0.051) (0.034) (0.034) (0.082) (0.079) (0.070) (0.069) (2.332) (2.393) (0.051) (0.050)
Exports / sales 0.128*** 0.122*** 0.174*** 0.196*** 0.356*** 0.419*** 0.441*** 0.568*** 1.894*** 2.583*** 0.149*** 0.142***
(0.033) (0.031) (0.026) (0.023) (0.069) (0.063) (0.052) (0.048) (0.466) (0.549) (0.033) (0.030)
Tradable –0.008 0.027** 0.077* 0.157*** 0.547*** –0.008
(0.018) (0.013) (0.040) (0.027) (0.184) (0.017)
Summary statistic
No. observations 1,078 1,078 1,078 1,078 1,078 1,078 1,078 1,078 1,085 1,085 1,075 1,075
R
2 0.17 0.17 0.29 0.27 0.21 0.21
Sector dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Cluster rut Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Estimator OLS OLS Tobit Tobit OLS OLS Tobit Tobit Probit Probit OLS OLS
* Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
*** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
a. This table reports the estimates of equation 5 in the text. The estimation method for each regression is reported in the bottom row. The dependent variable is as detailed
in each column. Net dollar debt is dollar debt net of derivative positions. The net derivative position is the notional value of the net long position of foreign exchange






Explanatory variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Dollar assets /
total assets –0.040 –0.039 –0.179 0.122
(0.013)*** (0.015)*** (0.578) (0.534)
Exports / sales –0.037 –0.036 –0.426 –0.008





Dollar debt / total







No. observations 1075 1075 1078 1078
R
2 0.13 0.13 –– ––
Sector dummies No Yes No Yes
* Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
*** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
a. The dependent variable is as detailed in each column. The estimation method is OLS in columns 1 and 2 and probit in
columns 3 and 4.  The net derivative position is the notional value of the net long position of foreign exchange derivatives with
domestic banks. Tradable firms are those in ISIC sectors 1 through 3 (agriculture, mining, and manufacturing). Firm-clustered
standard errors are reported in parentheses.Table 7. Corporate Determinants of Currency Exposure
a
Explanatory variable (1)
Expected sign of the
correlation
Ownership
Log (total assets) 0.018*** +
(0.003)
I (ADR) 0.081*** +
(0.024)
I (foreign) 0.043*** +
(0.013)
I (AFP) 0.020** +
(0.009)
I (GRUPO) 0.026** +
(0.012)
Liquidity risk
Current assets / current
liabilities –0.001* +
(0.000)




Ratio of lagged investment to
assets 0.023 –
(0.031)
ln (market-to-book ratio) –0.004** –
(0.002)
* Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
*** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
a. The table reports estimated coefficients for univariate regressions between excess dollar debt and each of the variables
reported in the table. Excess dollar debt is defined as the absolute value of the error term in a regression of dollar debt on
firm productive structure, as detailed in  column 2 of table 5. In the case of liquidity risk variables and investment
opportunities variables, the regression also includes total assets as a control. All liquidity variables are once lagged. I (AFP)
is a dummy variable for firms eligible to be included in the portfolio of pension fund regulators, I (foreign) is a dummy for
firms owned by foreign corporations, I (ADR) is a dummy for firms listing ADRs on the New York Stock Exchange, and I (GRUPO) is a
dummy for firms belonging to a conglomerate in 2002 as defined by the SVS. Liquidity and investment opportunity variables are as
defined in text. Firm ownership data are from various sources. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.Table 8. Average Three-Month Interest Rates and Exchange Rate Volatility
a
Percent
US$ (ex ante) US$ (ex post)
EMBI LIBOR EMBI LIBOR
Standard
deviation
Period UF No URR URR No URR URR No URR URR No URR URR ∆ (UF / US$)
1994–97 8.7 14.5 17.7 5.5 6.7 12.2 14.8 3.4 4.1 2.4
1998–99 9.8 14.8 18.0 5.5 6.7 17.6 21.3 8.0 9.7 2.5
2000–03 5.7 12.7 12.7 3.3 3.3 12.8 12.8 3.4 3.4 4.4
2000–04 5.3 12.0 12.0 3.0 3.0 12.3 12.3 3.2 3.2 4.4
a. UF corresponds to the average rate in the financial system on 30- to 89-day loans in CPI-indexed units of account (Unidad de Fomento, or UF). EMBI corresponds to the EMBI
yield, and LIBOR corresponds to the three-month LIBO rate in U.S. dollars. Ex post U.S. dollar interest rates are calculated as the ex ante U.S. dollar rates adjusted by changes
in the UF-US$ exchange rate. Interest rates labeled as URR have been adjusted by the encaje (or unremunerated reserve requirement) assuming a two-year loan period. Exchange rate
































Explanatory variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Log (total assets) 0.025*** 0.048*** 0.019*** 0.044*** 0.008 0.004 0.061*** 0.056** 0.050*** 0.044* 0.003** 0.000
(0.004) (0.012) (0.004) (0.012) (0.006) (0.018) (0.008) (0.024) (0.008) (0.026) (0.001) (0.006)
Dollar assets / total




(0.057) (0.028) (0.056) (0.029) (0.071) (0.056) (0.069) (0.059) (0.014) (0.013)




(0.036) (0.037) (0.033) (0.038) (0.043) (0.056) (0.062) (0.075) (0.060) (0.079) (0.008) (0.017)
Dollar debt / total
assets 0.105*** 0.086***
(0.036) (0.016)









(0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.013) (0.008) (0.014) (0.011) (0.016) (0.012) (0.004) (0.003)
Summary statistic
No. observations 923 923 921 921 921 921 923 923 921 921 921 921
R
2 0.28 0.75 0.29 0.72 0.02 0.6 0.41 0.79 0.43 0.77 0.16 0.51
Fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Firm-clustered standard
errors Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Dummy (1996–98) as a
percent of pre-float
exposure 18 22 33 37 122 125 28 27 44 41
* Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
*** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
a. This table reports the estimates of equation 5 in the text. The dependent variable in regressions 1 through 6 is the ratio of exposure to total assets; in regressions 7
through 10 it is the ratio of exposure to total liabilities. The estimation method is OLS. Observations from 1999 are excluded from the regressions. Dummy 1996-98 takes the value
of one in the pre-float period. The net derivative position is the notional value of the net long position of foreign exchange derivatives with domestic banks. Standard errors are
reported in parentheses.Table 10. Excess Dollar Debt
a
Explanatory
variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Pre-float 0.004 0.063 0.005 0.009** 0.003 0.007 0.003 0.000 0.003 0.007
(0.005) (0.049) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)


























No. observations 1,221 1,221 1,221 1,221 1,211 1,211 1,221 1,221 1,221 1,221
R
2 0.14 0.14 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
* Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
*** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
Source: Authors’ calculations.a. The dependent variable is the absolute value of excess dollar debt (net). The estimation method is OLS. I (AFP) is a dummy variable for firms eligible to be included in the
portfolio of pension fund regulators, I (foreign) is a dummy for firms owned by foreign corporations, I (ADR) is a dummy for firms listing ADRs on the New York Stock Exchange, and
I (GRUPO) is a dummy for firms belonging to a conglomerate in 2002 as defined by the SVS. Firm-clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Table 11. Macroeconomic Determinants of Net Dollar Debt
a
Macroeconomic determinants of net
dollar debt
Macroeconomic determinants of net dollar debt
interacted with firm characteristics
Explanatory variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Exports / sales 0.043 0.043 0.043 0.017 0.049 0.045 0.048 0.043
(0.077) (0.077) (0.077) (0.070) (0.079) (0.078) (0.078) (0.077)
Dollar assets / total
assets 0.135*** 0.139*** 0.139*** 0.121*** 0.139*** 0.139*** 0.135*** 0.139***
(0.034) (0.036) (0.036) (0.032) (0.036) (0.036) (0.033) (0.036)
Domestic interest rate 0.484*** 0.218
(0.110) (0.172)
Foreign interest rate –0.165** –0.215***
(0.074) (0.045)
Spread = (r – r* ) 0.216*** 0.191*** 0.175** 0.078 0.134 0.208
(0.056) (0.061) (0.075) (0.128) (0.086) (0.135)
Dummy(1996–99) = pre-
float 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.022*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.016*** 0.015***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
log (assets) x spread 0.068*
(0.035)
I (ADR) x spread 0.560
(0.722)
I (AFP) x spread 0.277
(0.170)
I (foreign) x spread 0.303
(0.277)
I (GRUPO) x spread 0.012
(0.133)
Summary statistic
No. observations 1,221 1,221 1,221 1,198 1,221 1,221 1,211 1,221
R
2 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.69 0.68 0.68 0.69 0.68
* Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
*** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
a. The dependent variable is dollar debt net of the notional derivative value with domestic banks. The estimation is OLS, firm fixed effects, and the main effects of those
variables that proxy for risk aversion in the interactions are included but not reported. I (AFP) is a dummy variable for firms eligible to be included in the portfolio of pension
fund regulators, I (foreign) is a dummy for firms owned by foreign corporations, I (ADR) is a dummy for firms listing ADRs on the New York Stock Exchange, and I (GRUPO) is a dummyfor firms belonging to a conglomerate in 2002 as defined by the SVS. Domestic interest rate is the average three-month rate of return on 30- to 89-day loans in the domestic
financial system in UF. The foreign interest rate is the annualized yield on the EMBI bond index. Standard errors adjusted by year clusters are reported in parentheses.Figure 1:Exchange Rate Exposure and Derivatives Position in Chilean Firms 
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Variables Definitions and Sources
Variable
Definition (codes correspond to
the FECU classification) Source
Main variables
Investment in fixed capital k(t) – k(t – 1) / total assets (t
– 1)
FECU
Dollar debt over lagged assets Book value of dollar debt (t) /
total assets
Complementary note to FECU
Dollar assets over lagged assets Book value of dollar assets (t)  /
total assets
Complementary note to FECU
Net long derivatives position
over lagged assets
Nominal value of foreign exchange
forward position / total assets
Central Bank of Chile and
FECU
Exposure dd2a – f2a – da2a
Tradable
a 1 if ISIC code (rev 2) is 1, 2 or
3
FECU
Exports over total assets Exports / total assets PROCHILE and  FECU
Exports over sales Exports / sales PROCHILE and  FECU
Secondary variables
Total assets 5.10.00.00 FECU
Sales 5.31.11.11 FECU
Capital stock 5.12.10.00 + 5.12.20.00 +
5.12.30.00 + 5.12.40.00
FECU
Leverage (total debt) over total
assets
(5.10.00.00 – 5.24.00.00) / total
assets
FECU
Cash flow from operations (EBIT) 5.31.11.00 + depreciation FECU
Cash flow from operations over
assets
EBIT / total assets
Depreciation  5.12.60.00 (t) – 5.12.60.00 (t–1) FECU
Current ratio = current assets /
current liabilities
5.11.00.00 / 5.21.00.00 FECU
Coverage ratio = accrued interest
/ cash flow  from operations
 5.31.12.60 / EBIT FECU
Market capitalization = PQE Market cap (December) Bolsa de Comercio
Accounting equity 5.24.00.00 FECU
Log (market–to–book) Log (PQE / accounting equity) FECU and Bolsa de Comercio
Log (Tobin’s q) Log [(PQE + total debt ) / total
assets]
FECU and Bolsa de Comercio
Maturity mismatch = (current liab
– current assets ) / total
assets




ADR 1 if firm has ADR on New York
Stock Exchange
J.P. Morgan











Log (real exchange rate) Log (TC_DIC / CPI_DIC) International Financial
Statistics
EMBI yield Annual EMBI return Bloomberg
Domestic interest rate Average annualized loan rate in
financial system in UF (1 – 3
years)
Central Bank of ChileCPI_DIC Consumer price index (December) International Financial
Statistics
TC_DIC Nominal exchange rate (December) International Financial
Statistics
a. There are two companies that we classified as tradable that do not follow this definition: LAN Chile (the privatized
national airline) and Cia. Sud Americana de Vapores (the shipping company).Documentos de Trabajo
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